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ALLSTATE INS. Co. v. TROELSTRup: APPLICATION OF THE
INTENTIONAL ACTS EXCLUSION UNDER
HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICIES TO
ACTS OF CHILD MOLESTATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, and in Colorado, the tragedy of sexual abuse
becomes a reality for children. In 1989, a national study found two mil-
lion reported incidents of child abuse of all types,' of which over
900,000 were confirmed. 2 Colorado recorded 7,224 confirmed reports
of child abuse or neglect in 1989, 3 classifying 1,969 as sexual abuse.4 Of
these, 1,208 were incest and 761 third party sexual abuse.
5
Colorado makes sexual abuse of a child a criminal offense.6 But
1. REPORT OF THE U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY
(1990).
2. Id.
3. CONFIRMED REPORTS TO THE CENTRAL REGISTY (sic), (unpublished report) (1990)
(hereinafter REPORT).
4. Sexual abuse of children is defined as "the involvement of dependant, develop-
mentally immature children in sexual activities that they do not fully comprehend and
therefore to which they are unable to give informed consent and/or which violate the
taboos of society." R. HELFER & R. KEMPE, THE BATrERED CHILD 286 (4th ed. 1987).
5. REPORT supra note 3. COLORADO CENTRAL REGISTRY, REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE
TO COLORADO CENTRAL REGISTRY FOR CHILD PROTECTION at 6 (1986). This report defines
incest as "inappropriate sexual activity where the victim to perpetrator relationship was as
natural parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, foster parent, [or] sibling (natural, adoptive or
stepsibling)" and third party sexual abuse as "inappropriate sexual activity with a child
where the perpetrator is unrelated to the victim."
6. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405 (Supp. 1990) Sexual Assault on a Child.
(1) Any actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual
contact commits sexual assault on a child if the victim is less than fifteen years of
age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim.
(2) Sexual assault on a child is a class 4 felony, but it is a class 3 felony if:
(a) The actor commits the offense on a victim by means of such force, intimida-
tion, or threat as specified in section 18-3-402 (1) (a), (1) (b), or (1) (c); or
(b) Repealed, L. 90, p. 1033, § 25, effective July 1, 1990.
(c) The actor commits the offense as a part of a pattern of sexual abuse. No
specific date or time must be alleged for the pattern of sexual abuse; except that
the acts constituting the pattern of sexual abuse must have been committed
within ten years of the offense charged in the information or indictment. The
offense charged in the offense or indictment shall constitute one of the incidents
of sexual contact involving a child necessary to form a pattern of sexual abuse as
defined in § 18-3-401 (2.5).
(3) If a defendant is convicted of a class 3 felony of sexual assault on a child
pursuant to paragraph (a) or (c) of subsection (2) of this section, the court shall
sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 16-11-309,
C.R.S.
Sexual contact within the meaning of section 18-3-405 is defined as:
the knowing touching of the victim's intimate parts by the actor, or of the actor's
intimate parts by the victim, or the knowing touching of the clothing covering the
immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts if that sexual contact can
reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification,
or abuse.
§ 18-3-401 (4) C.R.S. (1986).
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prosecution and incarceration of the abuser does little to help the vic-
tim, who may suffer psychological effects from the molestation. 7 Often
such effects are long-term and require extensive medical assistance and
psychological therapy.8 Abused children have sought compensation for
these damages through civil suits,9 often recovering from an abuser's
insurance policy. Recently, several jurisdictions have limited recovery
under an intentional act exclusion provision of an abuser's homeowner's
insurance policy. In Allstate Insurance Company v. Troelstrup,10 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court joined this trend.
Section II of this Comment provides background of such suits and
the trend towards limitation of recovery. Section III reviews pre-Troel-
strup Colorado case law concerning the nature of intentional acts within
the meaning of an intentional act exclusion clause of a homeowner's in-
surance policy. Section IV examines the Troelstrup decisions. Section V
reviews the cases from other jurisdictions cited in support by the Troel-
strup court. Finally, section VI discusses the implications of Troelstrup
and reviews alternative sources of recovery for child sexual abuse
victims.
II. BACKGROUND
Victims of child sexual abuse have sought recovery from their abus-
ers for costs of past, present and future counseling, therapy and medical
expenses.'1 They have also pursued damages for pain and suffering,
emotional trauma, diminished childhood, hedonic damages (economic
measurements of reduced enjoyment of life) and punitive damages,
12
often under differing theories of recovery.' 3 Such suits have produced
impressive results. Laurie M. v. Jeffery M. 14 granted an abused step-
daughter $100,000 in compensatory and $100,000 in punitive dam-
ages. 15 Thirteen alter boys who sued a Catholic priest for alleged sexual
abuse settled for $400,000 to $600,000 per child. 16 In Wilson v. Tobias-
See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.3 (1986) Sexual assault on a child by one in a
position of trust.
7. See generally C. WALKER, THE PHYSICALLY AND SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD, (1988); R.
HELFER & R. KEMPE, THE BArERED CHILD, (4th. ed. 1987); Comment, Insurance Coverage
for Child Sexual Abuse Under California Law, 18 Sw.U.L. REV. 171 (1988).
8. See Comment supra note 7 at 172; HELFER supra note 7 at 294.
9. Moss, Fighting Child Abuse, A.B.AJ. Oct. 1, 1987 at 36. See Comment, Civil Remedies
for Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 13 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 223 (1986) (identifying and sug-
gesting reforms of obstacles barring suit by incest victims against their abusers and outlin-
ing theories of recovery).
10. 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990).
11. For a lengthy discussion of the long term psychological effects of incest and resul-
tant need for therapy, see Jones v. Jones, 242 N.J. Super. 195, 576 A.2d 316 (1990).
12. Pimpinelli, Incest: The Secret Tort; Toward a Civil Cause of Action, NJ.LJ. Jan. 17,
1991, at 12.
13. See Comment, supra note 9, (discussing tort theories including intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, assault and bodily harm).
14. 159 A.D.2d 52, 559 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1990).
15. See id. at 56, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 339, for a discussion of punitive damage awards in
sexual abuse cases. The court reduced the amounts from the $200,000 actual and
$275,000 punitive damages awarded by the trial court.
16. Moss, supra note 9.
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sen, 17 the plaintiff, sexually abused by a Boy Scout leader, was awarded
$4.2 million. Such verdicts only benefit the victim if a source exists to
satisfy thejudgment. Often the most likely source is the abuser's home-
owner's insurance policy.
Most homeowner's policies contain an "intentional acts" exclusion
provision, allowing the insurer to deny coverage for injury or harm that
results from acts intended or expected by the insured. 18 Abuse involves
intentional behavior by the molester that, at first glance, appears to fal
squarely within the exclusion. Plaintiffs have avoided these exclusions
and obtained recovery by alleging that abusers, while intending the act
of molestation, did not have the subjective intent to injure. Although
suggesting that an act of sexual abuse is not intended to harm the victim
seems ludicrous, evidence suggests that in some cases it may be true.19
Defendants have introduced expert testimony, often uncontroverted,
supporting this distinction.2 0 Insurers, however, have sought to deny
coverage in these cases by arguing that courts should decline to make an
act/harm distinction and instead find that molesters intended the resul-
tant psychological injury.2 1 Finding such an intent to injure brings the
acts within the intentional act exclusion provisions and allows insurers
17. On appeal the punitive damages were vacated; the actual damages were affirmed.
97 Or. Ct. App. 536, 777 P.2d 1379 (1989).
18. The policy in the Troelstrup case excluded coverige for "bodily injury or property
damage intentionally caused by an insured person." Troelstrup, 789 P.2d at 417. See gener-
ally Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly
Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31 A.L.R.4th 957 (1990).
19. "Because the sexual victimization of children is so reprehensible, the offender is
perceived to be some sort of depraved monster. [W]e have ... not found this to be the
case. His offense has been more the product of immaturity than malicious intent ...."
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SENTENCING ADVOCACY, THE CHILD MOLESTER: CLINICAL OB-
SERVATIONS (1989).
See also D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY & RESEARCH 33-44 (1984).
Child sexual abuse in many cases is motivated by emotional rather than sexual needs.
Finkelhor summarizes theories about why a molester commits child sexual abuse into four
research models. Some theorists believe that child sexual abusers have an arrested psy-
chological development and thus have a need to relate to "other" children because of their
low sense of self-esteem. Some evidence suggests that molesters actually have a sexual
orientation for children. A third model holds that the abuser is unable to get his or her
sexual and emotional needs met in an adult relationship. This model is often seen in cases
of incest in dysfunctional families. The fourth factor is that some social conditioning, in-
cluding role models set by the abuser's own childhood, may make molestation more ac-
ceptable because some social norms have been altered or never learned. See generally M.
BRASSARD, PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YoUTH, 81-82 (1987); K.
FALLER, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, 89-115 (1988).
20. [Accused molester] Troelstrup presented deposition testimony from several
involved professionals, as well as from the investigating officer, all of whom, in
essence, expressed the opinion that Troelstrup had no subjective intention to
injure or harm the child. He also submitted a psychologist's affidavit in which the
opinion was expressed that Troelstrup had formulated no conscious intent to
harm the child.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 768 P.2d 731, 732 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). See also Foremost
Ins. Co. v. Weetman, 726 F. Supp. 618, 620 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v.
Doe, 788 P.2d 121, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Abbott, 204 Cal. App. 3d
1012, 1016-17, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620, 623-24 (1988).
21. See Grady & McKee, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR SEXUAL .IOLEST4TIOX OF
A MINOR: There should be no coverage for or duty to defend cases involving adnmtted acts of sexual
molestation by an insured, 56 DEF. COUNS. J. 170 (1989). This article reviews the trend of
1991]
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to deny any duty to defend the insured or satisfy a judgement assessed
against the insured.
Since 1982, eighteen states have decided, generally in declaratory
judgment actions brought by insurers, that the intent to injure will be
inferred as a matter of law from the intent to commit the molestation,
thus allowing insurers to deny liability under homeowner's insurance
policies. 2 2 In its decision in Troelstrup, the Colorado Supreme Court
joined the jurisdictions accepting this view.
III. COLORADO CASE LAW ON THE MEANING OF AN INTENTIONAL ACT
EXCLUSION OF A HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICY PRIOR TO
TROELSTRUP
Butler v. Behaeghe23 established the general approach in Colorado to
defining intentional acts within the meaning of an intentional act exclu-
sion in a homeowner's insurance policy. Behaeghe struck Butler in the
head with a steel pipe, causing serious injury. Behaeghe claimed he in-
tended to strike the plaintiff in the abdomen but not to injure him. After
a favorable jury verdict, Butler sought recovery against the third-party
defendant Safeco, the defendant's homeowner's insurance carrier.
Safeco denied liability, claiming the defendant's actions were intentional
within the meaning of the intentional acts exclusion.
Behaeghe, seeking to secure coverage, argued that for the exclusion
to apply, Safeco must show not only that he intended to strike the plain-
tiff but also intended to cause the specific resulting injury.24 The court
of appeals held that, within the meaning of an intentional act exclusion,
coverage is excluded if the insured acted with the intent to cause any
bodily injury, even if the resultant injury differed in character or magni-
tude from that expected. 2 5 The court found that in general such an ex-
decisional law in the area and concludes by noting the trend "favors insurers. We applaud
that trend." Id. at 178.
22. The first supreme court case to infer intent as a matter of law in a sexual assault
on a minor was Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1982). Hill is
widely cited as precedent, however, the Hill court did not create a new rule inferring intent
in all situations. Instead the court found the defendant had received actual notice as to the
harmful effects of his actions by prior warnings of the state health department and inferred
intent. See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Weetman, 726 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 684 F. Supp. 1056 (W.D. Okla. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698
F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1987); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Doe, 163 Ariz. 388, 788 P.2d 121
(Ct. App. 1989); CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 282 Ark. 90, 666 S.W.2d 689 (1984); J.C.
Penny Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 278 Cal. Rptr. 64, 804 P.2d 689 (1991); Landis v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 546 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 1989); Roe v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 259 Ga. 42, 376
S.E.2d 876 (1989); Altena v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 422 N.W.2d 485 (Iowa 1988); Harpy
v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 Md. App. 474, 545 A.2d 718 (1988); Worchester Ins.
v. Fells Acres Day School, 408 Mass. 393, 558 N.E.2d 958 (1990); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v.
Gardipey, 173 Mich. App. 711,434 N.W.2d 220 (1988); Lehmann v. Metzger, 355 N.W.2d
425 (Minn. 1984); MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 124 N.H. 456, 471 A.2d 1166 (1984);
Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986) (en banc); N.N. v. Moraine
Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis. 2d 84, 450 N.W.2d 445 (1990); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber,
376 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1988).
23. 37 Colo. App. 282, 548 P.2d 934 (1976).
24. Id. at 286, 548 P.2d at 938.
25. Id. at 287-88, 548 P.2d at 938-39 (emphasis added).
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clusion would apply unless the insured acted "without any intent or any
expectation of causing any injury, however slight."
26
The Colorado Supreme Court extended the scope of an exclusion-
ary provision in Chacon v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company. 27 In
Chacon, an insured sought recovery from his own insurance company for
damages he paid after his son vandalized a public school. The policy
provided coverage for the named insured and other residents of the in-
sured's household, and excluded coverage for acts intended by any in-
sured.28 The insurer denied coverage, arguing that this language
excluded coverage to all those insured for property damage which was
intended or expected by any individual insured. 29 The insured brought
the instant suit for breach of contract. The supreme court affirmed a
decision for the insurer.
Such an exclusion was held not to apply in American Family Mutual
Insurance Company v. Johnson,3 0 which involved a mistaken assault on an
innocent party. Johnson, after a domestic dispute, kicked a person
whom he thought was his wife but turned out to be Brown, an
uninvolved third party; Brown was subsequently successful in a personal
injury action. American, the plaintiff, from whom Johnson held a home-
owner's insurance policy, brought a declaratory judgment action alleg-
ing thatJohnson's actions were within the scope of the provision.5 1 The
court held that an act intended to accomplish a certain result which ac-
complishes a result not expected or intended does not fall within an in-
tentional acts exclusion. 3 2 SinceJohnson neither intended nor expected
to kick Brown, the exclusion did not apply.33 In Mangus v. Western Casu-
alty Surety Company,3 4 Miller was tried for assault to commit murder after
shooting Mangus, and found not guilty by reason of insanity. In a sub-
sequent settlement, Miller assigned all rights under his homeowner's
policy to Mangus. Western Casualty brought a declaratory judgment ac-
tion alleging that Miller's acts were intentional and it was thus not liable
for coverage under the intentional acts exclusion clause.3 5 The court
held that as the insured was insane at the time of the assault, the in-
sured's insanity, as a matter of law, precluded application of the
exclusion.
3 6
Thus, prior to the Troelstrup decision, an intentional act exclusion in
a homeowner's insurance policy had been held to apply where any in-
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. 788 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1990).
28. Id. at 750. The policy defined the insured as "you and your relatives if residents
of your household." The intentional act exclusion provided that coverage would not apply
for injury "expected or intended by any insured."
29. Id.
30. 796 P.2d 43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
31. Id. at 44. The provision excluded coverage for "bodily injury... which is ex-
pected or intended by any insured."
32. Id. at 45.
33. Id.
34. 41 Colo. App. 217, 585 P.2d 304 (1978).
35. Id. at 218, 585 P.2d at 305.
36. Id. at 219-20, 585 P.2d at 306.
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sured intended or expected to cause property damage or injury. Cover-
age was not excluded where the insured simply had no intent to injure,
injured the wrong person by mistake or was legally insane at the time of
the act and could not form the requisite intent.
IV. THE TROELSTRUP SERIES OF DECISIONS
A. Troelstrup v. District Court
3 7
In December 1983, W.M.L., a minor, filed a suit by and through his
mother in Denver district court against the defendant, Glenn Troel-
strup, alleging sexual assault and seeking money damages for negli-
gence and outrageous, willful and wanton conduct.a8 Troelstrup
tendered his defense to Allstate, his homeowner's insurance carrier.
Allstate accepted under reservation of rights and sought a declaratory
judgment that Troelstrup's actions fell within the intentional act exclu-
sion in his homeowner's policy.3 9 The district court refused Troel-
strup's request to delay the action and allowed the declaratory action to
proceed before the underlying civil trial. Troelstrup sought review of
the denial of his request to delay through a petition of prohibition and
mandamus. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, additionally noting
its belief that Allstate had a reasonable likelihood of success in the de-
claratory judgment action.40 Justice Erickson, joined by Justice Neigh-
bors, specially concurred in the result but stated that he believed the
court had "unnecessarily" stated that Allstate had a reasonable likeli-
hood of success. 41 On remand, the district court entered summary
judgment for Allstate.
37. 712 P.2d 1010 (Colo. 1986).
38. Id. at 1010. W.M.L. was a 12 year old patient at Fort Logan Mental Health
Center, a state mental health facility. Troelstrup, age 53, was a volunteer member of the
Mental Health Advisory Committee of the center. The alleged molestation occurred at the
facility. W.M.L. alleged that Troelstrup had committed homosexual acts, committed the
crime of sexual assault on a child, slept nude with W.M.L. and had photographed and
developed nude and erotic photographs of W.M.L.
39. Id. at 1010. The homeowner's insurance policy had an exclusionary clause that
provided: "We do not cover bodily injury or property damage intentionally caused by the
insured person."
40. Id. at 1012-13. "Hence... the nature and character of the alleged facts giving rise
to W.M.L.'s personal injury case establish a reasonable likelihood that the tortious conduct
of Troelstrup is excluded from coverage under his homeowner's policy." The court went
on to cite three other cases, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim W, 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 206 Cal. Rptr.
609 (1984); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Independent School Dist., 355 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1984);
Slate Farm Fre & Cas. Co. v. Williams, 355 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. 1984). All three cases in-
volved sexual assault, the first two on a minor and the last on a physically disabled adult.
The court found that all three supported the idea that "an intentional injury exclusion
clause may be invoked to negate the insurer's duty to defend where the nature and charac-
ter of the act is such that the intent to inflict injury may be inferred as a matter of law."
41. Troelstrup, at 1014. "[In so deciding], the majority virtually decides the merits of
Allstate's summary judgment claim, stating that Troelstrup's conduct is likely not covered
by the Allstate policy. Such a factual determination is properly made by the trial court."
(Erickson, J., concurring).
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B. Allstate Insurance Company v. Troelstrup4 2
The court of appeals reversed in Allstate Insurance Company v. Troel-
strup. The court initially determined that the sole issue before it was
whether, as a matter of law, Allstate would be excused from satisfying
any judgment W.M.L. might obtain against Troelstrup.4 3 The determi-
nation of that issue rested on whether Troelstrup had the subjective in-
tent to harm W.M.L.
4 4
Allstate argued that Troelstrup's previous nolo contendere plea4 5 and
his deposition admissions in the civil suit were sufficient, as a matter of
law, to bring his actions within the intentional act exclusion.4 6 Troel-
strup argued that, although he admitted the acts, he had provided un-
controverted deposition testimony from psychologists and the arresting
officer expressing opinions that he had no subjective intent to harm
W.M.L.4 7 Troelstrup claimed this constituted a genuine controversy as
to his intent to injure, raising a sufficient factual issue to preclude sum-
mary judgment.
4 8
The court of appeals found Butler v. Behaeghe4 9 to be controlling
precedent. The court also cited Allstate Insurance Company v. Steinemer50
for the "majority rule" that an exclusion did not apply to a policyholder
not intending that his act cause bodily injury, even given that harm was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act.5 ' The court held that
Troelstrup's subjective intent to harm was thus integral to the applica-
tion of the exclusion, and the determination of that intent was a factual
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
52
C. Allstate Insurance Company v. Troelstrup
5 3
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed in Allstate Insurance Company
v. Troelstrup. After reviewing Butler, the court noted that other jurisdic-
tions, while accepting this rule, had declined to apply it in cases of child
42. 768 P.2d 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. In a criminal trial held before the civil case was brought, Troelstrup pled nolo
contendere to a charge of felony sexual assault upon a child under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-
405 (1986) and received a three year prison sentence.
46. Id. at 732.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 37 Colo. App. 282, 548 P.2d 934 (1976). Fora discussion of Butler see supra notes
23-26 and accompanying text.
50. 723 F.2d 873 (1 th Cir. 1984).
51. 768 P.2d at 732. Steinemer involved an injury suffered when a minor injured his
friend by shooting him with a BB gun. The Eleventh Circuit followed what it termed the
"majority rule" which, within the meaning of an intentional act exclusion, separated an
intent to do an act from the intent to injure or cause harm by doing the act.
"Under the majority rule ... an 'intentional injury' exclusion will not apply if the
insured intentionally does an act, but has no intent to commit harm, even if the act involves
the foreseeable consequences of great harm or even amounts to gross or culpable negli-
gence." Id. (quoting Steinemer, 723 F.2d at 875) (emphasis in Allstate).
52. Allstate, 768 P.2d at 732.
53. 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990).
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molestation. 54 The other courts expressed several theories in support
of such holdings. Some used an objective test.55 This test permitted an
inference of intent, since a reasonable person would expect injury to
result from molestation. This approach, however, had been criticized as
being overly broad.56 Moreover, most jurisdictions that had considered
the issue had decided to infer an intent to injure as a matter of law.
57
The court found that jurisdictions which inferred intent as a matter
of law had taken judicial notice that sexual assault on a child will inevita-
bly produce some harm.58 The court quoted from Allstate Insurance Com-
pany v. Kim W, 59 declaring that injury is inherent in acts of child
molestation. 60 It also noted that both the Colorado legislature 61 and
court of appeals 62 had found harm present in cases of molestation. The
court also found the criminal statutes concerning child abuse implicitly
contained the idea that harm is present in and flows from the forbidden
behavior.
6 3
In its decision, the court held that an intent to injure would be in-
ferred as a matter of law from an intentional act of child molestation.
64
As a result, the subjective intent of the insured would not be relevant in
the determination of whether an intentional injury exclusion precluded
coverage.6 5 The court rejected Troelstrup's claim that the rule should
54. Id. at 418.
55. Such a test "considers what a 'plain ordinary person would expect and intend to
result [from the offender's sexual misconduct].'" Id. at 419 (quoting CNA Ins. Co. v.
McGinnis, 282 Ark. 90, 94, 666 S.W.2d 689, 691 (1984)).
56. "[Tlhe policy specifically states that the insured must expect or intend harm ....
[I]f an objective standard is used, virtually no intentional act would ever be covered."
Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash. 2d 381, 385, 729 P.2d 627, 630 (1986).
57. 789 P.2d at 419.
58. Id.
59. 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 334, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609, 613 (1984).
60. [I]mplicit in the determination that children must be protected from such acts
is a determination that at least some harm is inherent in and inevitably results
from those acts .... "The harm may be manifested in many different mental,
emotional and physical ways, leaving a child with possible lasting and debilitating
fears."
Id. (quoting People v. Austin, 111 Cal. App. 3d 110, 114-115, 168 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407
(1980)).
61. The legislature has declared that "the sexual exploitation of children constitutes a
wrongful invasion of the child's right of privacy and results in social, developmental and
emotional injury to the child ...." (quoting CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-6-403 8B (1986)).
This section refers to sexual exploitation of a child, a different offense than Troelstrup was
charged with. The quoted language appears in section one of the statute and is a state-
ment of legislative intent only. The court has held that social, developmental and emo-
tional injury to the child is specifically not an element of this crime. Id. People v. Enea, 665
P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1983).
62. Kim W, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 334, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613. Child molestation "is
indeed a heinous crime that causes devastating results whenever it is committed, particu-
larly when the perpetrator is in a position of trust." (quoting People v. Garciadealba, 736
P.2d 1240, 1243 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986)).
63. Id.
64. Id. Troelstrup had admitted the intentional nature of the acts. Troelstrup had
pled nolo contendere to the charge of sexual assault on a minor and the trial judge had deter-
mined that Troelstrup's actions were taken "to satisfy his own gratification." Id. at 417.
The court cited as support the cases discussed infra in section V.
65. Kim W, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The court said this deci-
sion does not "completely reject the [insured's] subjective intent; rather [it] overrule[s] the
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not preclude coverage for his actions as they were not "extreme," citing
Horace Mann Insurance Company v. LeeberA6 which found that the majority
rule inferring intent was not limited to cases involving "violence," "pen-
etration" or an abuse over a "lengthy period of time."6 7
Troelstrup did not contend that the count of negligence in the com-
plaint was relevant to the resolution of the issue.68 The court men-
tioned in a footnote that a Michigan court of appeals case had denied
coverage for a "negligent" molestation claim, calling it a "transparent
attempt to trigger insurance coverage" by recharacterizing intentional
child molestation as negligence.69 Finally, Troelstrup's claims that All-
state had not zealously pursued his defense in the civil case during the
pendency of the declaratory judgment were rejected, the court noting
that because Allstate had accepted under reservation of rights, its only
obligation was to prevent a default judgment or other prejudicial
action.7 0
V. DECISIONS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS CITED AS SUPPORT IN
TROELSTRuP
Troelstrup cited decisions from California, Iowa, Minnesota and
Washington in support of the holding.7 1 Fire Insurance Exchange v. Ab-
bott 72 was a consolidated action involving two separate defendants ac-
cused of unrelated acts of sexual misconduct with a minor. Both
defendants admitted their acts but denied subjective intent to injure.
73
The court decided the question of intent in light of a statute excluding
coverage for "wilful" acts of an insured. 74 The statute is construed as a
part of all policies written in California; Colorado has no analogous stat-
utory language. Abbott adopted the holding of a previous California
case 75 inferring intent to injure as a matter of law from an intentional act
of molestation within the meaning of the "wilful" statute.7 6 Unlike
Troelstrup, Abbott did not involve an underlying criminal prosecution.
7 7
insured's actual intent in limited circumstances." (quoting Rodriguez v. Williams, 107
Wash. 2d 381, 385, 729 P.2d 627, 630 (1986)).
Of note is Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1989). The Landis
court excluded coverage based on the insured's intentional act of molestation itself, not
reaching the question of specific intent. "[Wle believe that specific intent to commit harm
is not required by the intentional acts exclusion. Rather, all intentional acts are properly
excluded by the express language of the homeowner's policy."
66. 376 S.E.2d 581, 585-86 (W. Va. 1988).
67. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d at 420.
68. Id. at 418.
69. Id. at 418 n.7 (citing Linebaugh v. Berdish, 144 Mich. App. 750, 757, 376 N.W.2d
400, 406 (1985)).
70. Id. at 420.
71. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d at 419.
72. 204 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1988).
73. Id. at 1016, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
74. "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured ......
CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West Ann. 1990).
75. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim W., 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1984).
76. InJ.C. Penny Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689, 278 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1991), the
California Supreme Court upheld the holdings in both these cases.
77. The result in Abbott was upheld inJ.C. Penny Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689,
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Altena v. United Fire and Casulty Company 78 involved an adult victim of
sexual abuse by a relative. The Altena court, although noting that the
victim was an adult potentially distinguished the case from others involv-
ing abuse of a minor, adopted the holding in State Farm Fire and Casulty
Company v. Williams 79 which refused to make that distinction. 80 Thus,
Troelstrup's reliance on Altena for support may indicate that Colorado
would extend the rule to cases involving sexual assault on an adult, de-
spite the court's express limitation of its holding to situations involving
minors. 8 1 Altena, like Abbott, did not involve an underlying criminal
prosecution.
In Lehman v. Metzger,82 an uncle was alleged to have sexually abused
his minor niece. It is not clear from the reported decision if Metzger
admitted his acts. The Lehman court, in a perhaps overly broad holding,
inferred intent to injure as a matter of law where the underlying claim
was that the insured intentionally sexually assaulted a victim (not limited
to an adult).83 The court provided no analysis, merely citing previous
state decisions.
8 4
In Rodriguez v. Williams,85 after Williams was convicted of commit-
ting incest with his minor stepdaughter, the stepdaughter filed a civil
suit.86 In the declaratory judgment action brought by his insurer, Wil-
liams in deposition admitted the incest but denied the subjective intent
to injure.87 He introduced an affidavit from his psychologist in sup-
port.88 The Washington Supreme Court rejected the reasonable person
standard applied by the court of appeals, finding the exclusion must be
interpreted from the insured's standpoint. 89 Nonetheless, the court
concluded that in cases involving incest it would infer intent to injure as
a matter of law and thus declined to allow coverage. 90
278 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1991). The California Supreme Court also decided the issue in light of
section 533 of the California Insurance Code. Of note is that the court found the language
of the statute sufficient to infer intent: "Because we agree ... that child molestation is
wilful as a matter of law under section 553, we do not base our decision on the insured's
admissions of wrongdoing. Neither an admission nora criminal conviction is necessary to give rise
to the exclusion under section 533." Id. at 840 P.2d at 698 n.13, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 73
(emphasis added). Thus the California line of cases in this area, based on a state statute,
provides questionable support for Colorado's common law decision.
78. 422 N.W.2d 485 (Iowa 1988).
79. 355 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. 1984).
80. Altena, at 422 N.W.2d at 489.
81. "We conclude that an intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law where child
molestation is involved." Troestrup, 789 P.2d 415, 419 (emphasis added).
82. 355 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 1984).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 426.
85. 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986).
86. Id. at 382, 729 P.2d at 628.




90. Id. at 388, 729 P.2d at 630. The court cited Linebaugh v. Berdish, 144 Mich. App.
750, 376 N.W.2d 400 (1985) and State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Williams, 355 N.W.2d 421
(Minn. 1984), both reaching similar results in sexual abuse cases.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS OF TROELSTRUP FOR VICTIMS OF
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
It is not yet clear what effect the Troelstrup decision will have in Col-
orado. No commentators have yet analyzed the implications in those
jurisdictions which preceded Colorado in finding intent as a matter of
law in abuse cases. One California justice has offered a cautionary dis-
sent on the effects of a similar decision in that state. J.C. Penney Casulty
Insurance Company v. M.K.,91 settling a split in California appellate
courts, 92 reached the same holding as the Troelstrup court. Writing in
dissent, Justice Broussard identified two areas of concern with the ma-
jority opinion. Justice Broussard accused the majority of "practicing
psychiatry without a license and doing a terrible job of it."'9 s He pointed
out that all the expert testimony in the case showed that the abuser had
no subjective intent to harm the victim, even though the majority held
the testimony "irrelevant" and quoted from other cases to the effect that
such testimony "flies in the face of all reason, common sense and experi-
ence." 94 In strong language, Justice Broussard rebuked the majority for
discarding the expert testimony.9 5 He also noted that liability insurance
serves a two-fold function in society. Such insurance provides not only
funds for the wrongdoer to use to pay his debts but is a source of com-
pensation, often the only source, for victims. 96
Of note is that Troelstrup does not give guidance to what result the
court would have reached had the defendant denied the allegations in
the civil suit. Of the cases cited as support, the alleged molesters in
Abbott, Altena and Rodriguez admitted their actions. In Lehman the act was
established at a trial on coverage with no reference to an admission. In a
similar declaratory judgment action brought in Colorado by an insurer
subsequent to Troelstrup, a plaintiff's lawyer has successfully avoided the
application of the Troelstrup decision where the defendant in that case
denied committing the alleged acts.
97
The court in Troelstrup found it unnecessary to address the effect of
the nolo contendere plea, finding that the admissions in the deposition pro-
vided sufficient basis for its holding. 98 Even if it had reached that issue,
91. 52 Cal. 3d 1009, 804 P.2d 689, 278 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1991).
92. The difference centered on inferring intent to injure as a matter of law in child
molestation cases within the meaning of § 533 of the California Insurance Code, applying
a "wilful acts" exclusion to all policies in the state.
93. 804 P.2d at 701, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 704, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
95. There is nothing in our record to justify this shocking attack on the science of
psychiatry. Neither the majority opinion nor the cited authorities provide any
empirical evidence for such an attack, and the experience involved is that of child
molesters and those who work with child molesters, notjudges. In the absence of
experience, judges should not undertake to practice psychiatry. Id
96. "Often the wrongdoer's insurance is the only way the innocent victims of crime,
including child molestation, may recover compensation for medical expenses, their disa-
bilities and their injuries." Id. at 703, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
97. Conversation with Tim Devereux, Esq. (Feb. 18, 1991).
98. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 417 n.6.
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a nolo contendere plea has been held not relevant to prove intent.9 9 Thus,
if Troelstrup had denied the charges in the civil action, the court would
have had nothing on which to base its newly created mandatory infer-
ence of intent. Additionally, the court has long held that a guilty verdict
may be introduced only as prima facie evidence in a civil case.1 00 Had
Troelstrup been convicted in the criminal case and denied the charge in
the civil suit, the verdict could have been introduced only as prima facie
evidence. Trial courts are now apparently in the position of either up-
setting precedent and inferring intent as a matter of law from the previ-
ously prima facie evidence of a conviction, or not granting summary
judgment to an insurer and charging it with the duty to defend the suit.
Of the cases cited as support in Troelstrup, only Rodriguez v. Williams 10 1
involved a criminal prosecution. Williams was convicted of incest and
subsequently admitted his acts in deposition in the declaratory judg-
ment action. 10 2 As in Troelstrup, the Rodriguez court accepted the deposi-
tion testimony, not considering (or even discussing) the criminal
conviction. 10 3 Other states which have considered the use of criminal
convictions in similar declaratory judgment actions have reached differ-
ing results. 1
0 4
Also unresolved is the potential extent of the decision's application.
Given the plain language of the holding,10 5 it is unclear if the decision
covers any case in which child molestation is initially alleged, even if de-
nied by the defendant. Lehman v. Metzger, cited as support, appears to
exclude coverage where the claim alleges sexual assault. 106 If the doc-
trine does so extend, it is not obvious what occurs after an insurer is
released from any obligation to defend in a pre-trial declaratory judg-
ment action over the denials of the insured and ajury subsequently finds
that indeed no molestation occurred, or that the claim itself was spuri-
ous. It is possible that an insured may then seek reimbursement for his
costs. Also, as noted above, the Troelstrup holding is specifically limited
to cases involving child molestation,1 0 7 yet it cites Altena, involving an
adult victim, for support. As the case does not define what it considers
child molestation, nor limit any such definition by reference to the stat-
ute, it is possible that the age of the molester is not determinative.1
0 8
99. See People v. Goodwin, 197 Colo. 47, 593 P.2d 326 (1979).
100. Approximately Fifty-Nine Gambling Devices v. People, 110 Colo. 82, 130 P.2d
920 (1942).
101. 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (Wash. 1986).
102. Id. at 383, 729 P.2d at 628.
103. Id. at 388, 729 P.2d at 631.
104. See Annotation, Criminal Conviction as Rendering Conduct for Insured Convicted Within
Promsion of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Coverage for Damage or Injury Intended or
Expected by Insured, 35 A.L.R.4th 1063 (1990). This annotation discusses the use of convic-
tions on either a jury verdict or a guilty plea. There are no cases concerning use of a plea
of no/o contendere.
105. "We conclude that an intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law where
child molestation is involved." Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 419 (emphasis added).
106. 355 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 1984), see also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
107. 789 P.2d at 419.
108. Colorado makes sexual assault on a child a crime only where "the victim is less
than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim." CoLo.
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Troelstrup may thus apply to alleged molesters who are themselves mi-
nors. The ruling could in theory apply to a molester less than ten years
old, even though such a defendant can not be criminally charged. 10 9
Troelstrup should not affect a victim's initial ability to receive com-
pensation, if needed, for therapy and medical expenses. Funds are usu-
ally available from the local county Victim's Assistance program. 1 10
Recognizing the importance of such programs, a Presidential panel has
recommended an increase in funding for state and local programs that
assist minor victims of abuse, including sexual abuse. 1 11 If a criminal
case is successfully prosecuted, the court may order restitution from the
defendant in addition to other penalties. 112 There remains, however,
the difference between an order for, and payment of, restitution.' 
1 3
Troelstrup's effects will primarily be felt by the victim seeking recov-
ery for long-term or late-discovered psychological injuries 1 4 or for
non-economic damages. Where will this compensation come from after
Troelsirup? A victim may search for an alternate insurance policy provid-
ing coverage.' 15 A plaintiff may always seek recovery from a defend-
REv. STAT. § 18-3-405 (1986) (emphasis added). It is unclear if Troelstrup applies to a mo-
lester who can not be criminally charged.
Two decisions provide conflicting guidance in this matter. Compare Illinois Farmers Ins.
Co. v. Judith G., 379 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding no coverage for a minor
who was between the ages of 13 and 16 when he sexually assaulted two minors) with Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Jack S., 709 F. Supp. 963 (D. Nev. 1989) (refusing to infer intent and thus al-
lowing coverage for a 14 year old alleged abuser).
109. A person under ten years old can not be found guilty of a criminal offense in
Colorado. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-1-801 (1986).
110. Victim's Assistance offices are divisions of the District Attorney's offices in the
Denver metro area. Compensation is usually subject to approval by a review board before
disbursement.
Compensation varies in the Denver metro area: Adams County pays for a maximum
of ten therapy sessions at a maximum of $60 per session and will pay some medical ex-
penses if the victim has no primary insurance. Arapahoe County has no set maximum
dollar amount or number of visits. It seeks a treatment plan from a therapist and will
generally follow the recommendations in that plan. Arapahoe also pays reasonable medical
expenses.
Denver provides a maximum of $2,500 for therapy plus will pay for hospitalization
and miscellaneous medical expenses. Jefferson County will pay for one therapy session
per week at a maximum of $60 per session for a reasonable number of sessions. It will also
pay medical expenses, with a total maximum therapy and medical expenditure of$10,000
per victim.
11. PRESIDENT'S CHILD SAFETY PARTNERSHIP, FINAL REPORT 128-35 (1987). The
panel urged states to reduce or eliminate factors which may prevent minors from receiving
compensation from assistance programs offered by state and local governments, such as
the victim's age, the nature of the crime and the victim's unique reactions. It also sug-
gested that state and local governments develop "alternative funding mechanisms," such
as surcharges on wedding licenses or birth certificates, asset forfeiture of individuals con-
victed of child exploitation and mandatory fines or penalties in addition to existing crimi-
nal sanctions, to generate revenue to fund such compensation programs.
112. Such restitution is usually ordered paid as reimbursement to a Victim's Assistance
program if the victim has received such aid.
113. See infra note 117.
114. See Comment, Civil Remedies for Victims of Childhood S6=al Abuse, 13 OHIo N.U.L.
REV. 223, 229 (1986).
115. See Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392,442 N.Y.S.2d 422, 425
N.E.2d 810 (1981) (holding that, under a professional liability policy covering liability for
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ant's personal assets. In Doe v. Uhler,116 the plaintiff attached the
defendant's real property to avoid possible liquidation intended to avoid
a writ of execution. Obviously if the abuser is not of sufficient means to
satisfy the order or is judgment proof, any victory will be hollow. 1
7
One commentator suggests that incest victims may be able to re-
cover under a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress,' 18 a
tort recognized in Colorado 119 but not yet interpreted in this procedural
setting. Although the underlying complaint in Troelstrup contained a
count of negligence, the court did not address it as Troelstrup did not
argue the issue. Nonetheless, given the court's approving reference to a
Michigan case characterizing a negligence count as a "transparent at-
tempt" to avoid the effect of inferring intent,' 20 it seems reasonable to
expect an insurer may prevail in a declaratory judgment action against
such a count.
12 1
A victim may also seek recovery by filing suit against others who
may have been negligent in allowing the abuse to occur. 12 2 The parent
who did not commit the incest but knew or should have known that the
incest was being committed and negligently failed to intervene may be
reached through his or her homeowner's insurance policy. This ap-
proach may fail if the policy contains language similar to that in
injury resulting from "assault" or "undue familiarity," the insurance company had a duty
to defend dentist who had allegedly sexually assaulted an adult female patient).
116. 220 N.J. Super. 522, 532 A.2d 1133 (1987).
117. "Particularly as to child molesters, the wrongdoers are likely to be incarcerated
* and there is little likelihood that a judgment recovered against the wrongdoer can be
collected out of the wrongdoer's earnings. The wrongdoer will ordinarily be faced with
substantial legal expenses depleting whatever assets he may have had." J.C. Penney, 804
P.2d at 703, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
118. Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV., 609, 627-
28 (1983).
119. See Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978). In Towns, a minor
brought suit against a plumbing company after he witnessed an explosion which injured
his sister. He alleged the defendant had negligently exposed him to an unreasonable risk
of bodily harm. In finding the plaintiff had stated a cause of action, the court adopted the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 436(2) which provided: "If the actor's conduct is
negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another... the fact
that such harm results solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional dis-
turbance does not protect the actor from liability."
The court also cited with approval the definition of bodily harm from the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment C: "long continued nausea or headaches may
amount to physical illness, which is bodily harm; and even long continued mental distur-
bance, as for example in the case of repeated hysterical attacks, or mental aberration...."
In subsequent cases, Colorado has limited third party claims of fear for another's
safety where the third party was outside the "zone of danger." See Hale v. Morris, 725
P.2d 26 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
120. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 418 n.7 (quoting Linebaugh v. Berdish, 144 Mich. App. 750,
757, 376 N.W.2d 400, 406 (1985)).
121. But see State Farm v. Nycum, - F.2d -, 1991 WL 164632 (9th Cir. 1991), distin-
guishingj. C Penny and finding coverage when the jury found liability on a general verdict
which could have been premised on a finding of either intentional molestation or negli-
gent touching. The court rejected an automatic application of theJ.C. Penny doctrine in
any case involving an allegation of molestation.
122. Parents of a three year old boy who was molested by an employee of a McDonald's
restaurant sued the company alleging negligent hiring. The plaintiff sought $3.7 million
in damages. Denver Post, Mar. 1, 1991 sec. B, at 2 col. 1.
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Chacon 123 as discussed in section III. As Chacon involved a married
couple, it may be distinguishable if the abuser lives with but is not mar-
ried to the parent and thus not a relative within the meaning of the
policy.
VII. CONCLUSION
With its decision in Troelstrup, the Colorado Supreme Court, joining
a developing national trend, has foreclosed a major avenue of compen-
sation for victims of child molestation. Yet it is unclear if the Troelstrup
court was responding to social needs or insurer pressures. As abhorrent
as the reality of sexual abuse of a child is, there is no clear reason for this
exception to the Butler rule. Reference to Colorado's criminal statutes is
unpersuasive as the offense is sexual contact with a minor which can
"reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal,
gratification or abuse."' 24 This incorporates the reasonable person re-
view of the act specifically rejected in Troelstrup as overbroad. Addition-
ally, as discussed above, a guilty verdict is admissible only as prima facie
evidence.
Also troubling is the rejection of expert testimony as irrelevant.
Where the determinative issue is the intent of the insured to cause harm,
as set forth in Butler, it seems that expert evidence on this very point is
crucial. Yet the court declared such testimony as irrelevant. Insurers
argue that this trend represents sound public policy,' 25 yet it seems to
represent a fundamental shift in twentieth century tort law theory.' 26
The argument that an abuser will be less likely to commit acts of abuse if
he realizes that his homeowners insurer will not be available to defend
him or satisfy a judgment is spurious.' 27
123. Chacon v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1990).
124. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-405 (1986). See supra note 6 for the full text of the
statute.
125. See Grady & McKee, supra note 21, at 177-78.
126. In the late nineteenth century, liability insurance was viewed strictly as a contract
between the insured and the insurer. The insured was generally an employer, and an
injured employee had no direct recourse against the insurer. This changed in the early
part of the twentieth century. Insurance began to be regarded as a source of compensa-
tion for injured persons. This switch in viewpoints was driven by a larger change in the
perceived purpose of tort law. Tort law had been a means to punish the blameworthy for
their misdeeds, so that losses would "lie where they fell" unless the plaintiff could find a
culpable defendant. Twentieth century tort theorists began to view tort law as an efficient
way to spread the costs of injury throughout society. G. WHriE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA,
146-153 (1980). The trend adopted by Troestrup is a swing backwards, focussing on the
bad acts of the defendant and ignoring the compensation needs of the victim. See generally,
R. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAw, 1983; G. CALABRESI, IDEAS, BELIEFS, ATrrrUDES,
AND THE LAw (1985).
127. The availability of insurance coverage for child sexual abuse will affect the
perpetrator's choice to commit the act only if financial responsibility is one of his
concerns. Moreover, child sexual abuse is criminal conduct. A perpetrator cov-
ered by a homeowner's policy would not be more likely to sexually abuse a child
because he had a homeowners policy as he would still be subject to criminal liabil-
ity. If financial responsibility is a concern, the perpetrator has knowledge that his
action will harm the child. The very fact that a perpetrator knows he will become
financially responsible for the injuries sustained.., indicates that he is substan-
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Rather than carving a wholesale exception to the Butler doctrine, the
court could have created a rebuttable presumption, placing the burden
on the alleged molester to show through credible evidence, including
expert testimony, that he did not have the intent to injure. Or the court
simply could have required insurers to specifically exempt coverage in
the language of their policies. The fact that this unique situation re-
quired an exception to Butler dispels a "parade of horribles" argument
of a twenty page policy of which eighteen pages are enumerated excep-
tions to coverage.
Ultimately, the boundaries and implications of this new area of tort
law remain to be determined by the courts in Colorado and other juris-
dictions which have chosen to follow this trend in the law. 128 The needs
of the victims, however, have not changed. With this major avenue of
recovery now blocked, needed and deserved compensation may become
unavailable in many cases, thus increasing the suffering of the victims.
Daniel K. Frey
tially certain that the child will be injured by his conduct [thus establishing the
requisite intent to injure and triggering the policy exception].
Comment, supra note 7, at 175-76 (1988).
128. The California legislature recently passed a bill reversing the decision in J.C.
Penny. See 1991 Ca. S.B. 1147. The bill provides that in a civil action for damages for
injury resulting from an act of child molestation, the defendant's intent may not be implied
absent an evidentiary hearing on the matter and an insurer is not exonerated unless the
trier of fact specifically finds that the insured harbored a preconceived notion to intention-
ally harm. See also DebraJ. Saunders, California's Child Molesters'Relief Act, WALL ST.J., Oct.
3, 1991, at A18.
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